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Articles
Chen Tiqiang* The People's Republic of
China and Public
International Law
The topic under discussion is subdivided into three parts: (1)
background and retrospect, (2) the study of international law in
China, (3) the PRC's application of international law and
contribution to the development of international law.
I. Background and Retrospect
Like all human phenomena, the PRC's attitude toward international
law cannot be divorced from China's experience with international
law in the past. For an understanding of the present views of the
PRC with regard to international law, it is necessary to take a quick
glance at her experience with international law in the past one and a
half century. -
International law, in its most general meaning is the generic name
for all the principles, norms, rules and institutions governing the
relations among states. More specifically it consists of a body of
such principles, rules and institutions that has been developed more
or less systematically among new-born capitalist states of Europe
roughly from the 17th century onwards. Prior to this, in the
slave-owning society (such as the Greek city states) and feudal
society, there also existed similar principles, rules, norms and
institutions. But these were sporadic and isolated phenomena, and
did not reach a stage of systematic development. Some fell into
disuse and were extinct, and some were absorbed into the more
modern system of international law. In ancient China, before the
formation of a unified state, or during periods of break-up of the
empire when independent kingdoms and political power groups
existed side by side with each other, or in transactions between the
central government and fringing nationalities, there also existed
*Note - Formerly spelt as "Ti-Chiang Chen", author of "International Law of
Recognition," 1951. Professor Chen is currently professor of International Law at
Peking University and the Foreign Affairs College, Beijing, and Vice-President of
the Chinese Society of International Law. All references to Chinese writings,
unless otherwise indicated, are in Chinese. May, 1982.
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similar principles and rules. These, too did not have the chance to
develop into a system. By international law, I mean only the system
which originated in Europe and has undergone development and
change to this day. In every stage in history, new forces asserted
themselves, and manifested themselves in new principles, norms,
rules and institutions. We now have a system which is connected
with European culture and tradition and facts of life in the past, but
is essentially a reflection of the world order of today.
This Europe-originated system of international law is the product
of capitalism. It serves the interests of capitalist states, especially
the most powerful of them. In every period of history, there were
always one, two or three most powerful states in the capitalist
world, which exercised predominant influence on the formation and
formulation of international law, determined its contents and made
it subservient to their interests. Yet in the absence of a unified world
and with the continued existence of independent states, the Great
Powers - however powerful - could not do everything they
wished; for they were constrained by the balance of powers among
themselves and checked by the resistance of lesser powers, which
could not be overlooked, especially when acting in unison. The
existence of independent states gave rise to mutual intercourse,
transactions and flow of commerce. All these developments
necessitated some rules more or less based on equality, reciprocity
and cooperation. These were the mainstay of the international order
among those states. In their imperialist expansion in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, the European Great Powers vied for supremacy,
but also acted in cooperation in suppressing the resistance of the
oppressed peoples of those regions. They made in common rules
and institutions for the domination and enslavement of Asian,
African and Latin American colonies and semi-colonies. On the
other hand, there were also some principles and norms which
emerged during the struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudal
oppression. These continue to have meaning in the present day.
When the Western powers appeared on the Chinese scene, they
brought with them this system of international law. But though they
applied among themselves the whole system of international law,
they applied to China only those portions which authorized and
legitimatized the plundering, exploitation and oppression of
colonial peoples. James Lorimer, the distinguished British
international lawyer, wrote in 1883 in his Institutes of International
Law: "As a political phenomenon, humanity in its present
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condition, divides itself into three concentral zones or spheres -
that of civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity and that of
savage humanity." To these three spheres of humanity, the
"civilized nations" accord three stages of recognition: "plenary
political recognition, partial political recognition and natural or
mere human recognition ."' The sphere of plenary political
recognition extended to European and American states and their
colonies peopled by white men. The sphere of partial political
recognition extended to Turkey, Persia, China, Siam and Japan.
The rest of mankind belonged to the sphere of mere human
recognition: "It is with the first of these spheres alone that the
international jurist has directly to deal." "He is not bound to apply
the positive law of nations to savages, or even to barbarians as
such."
2
Oppenheim in his 1905 edition of International Law affirmed
Lorimer's view, except that he down-graded the position of China
even further. He divided states into five classes: (1) European states;
(2) American states, Liberia and Haiti; (3) Turkey; (4) Japan; (5)
Persia, Siam, China, Korea and Abyssinia. Regarding class five, he
said: "However, their civilization has not yet reached that condition
which is necessary to enable their governments and their population
in every respect to understand and to carry out the command of the
rules of International Law." 3 In the 8th edition (1955) of
Oppenheim's International Law, Lauterpacht added India and
Pakistan to the fourth class along with Japan, and deleted Korea and
Persia from class five.4 This is a further downgrading of China well
below the colonial countries of yesterday, India and Pakistan.
Lorimer, listing China among "barbarians", seemed to rate China
one level higher than "savages". But as far as the application of
international law was concerned, he made it quite clear that China
would be in the same category as savages. Oppenheim also
intimated that the law of nations did not include rules of intercourse
with and treatment of nations outside the family of nations. Such
intercourse and treatment should be regulated by the principles of
Christian morality. He wrote: "States not so accepted (i.e. accepted
into the Family of Nations) were not (at least in theory) bound by
international law, nor were the civilized nations bound by it in their
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behaviour towards them, as was evidenced by their behaviour with
regard to Africa and (in part) to China." 5
Lorimer's and Oppenheim's views were not their own fanciful
speculations, but were reflections of the facts of their time. When
the Western powers came to China, they first put down China's
resistance by force, and then placed China under a regime of
unequal treaties. All relations with China were conducted by
reference to these treaties, and there was no application of such
international law as were applied among themselves. Shueh Fu
Cheng, one of the earliest diplomats during Qing Dynasty remarked
with a singular clarity of insight in his book Yung A Collected
Essays that, in the intercourse with Western countries, "China can
only act according to treaties, and cannot invoke public law (i.e.
international law)." As late as 1931, after the occupation of China's
Northeastern Provinces by Japan, the Japanese representative at the
League of Nations declared that China was not an "organized
state." While this was a slanderous attack by an aggressor, it was
also true that China was at that time not treated by imperialist
powers as a truly independent, sovereign state. Under the unequal
treaties, China was actually deprived of the basic attributes of a
sovereign state. The imperialist powers had the right to station
troops on Chinese territory. Their merchantmen and warships could
freely navigate China's internal waters. Their nationals enjoyed the
right of extraterritoriality and were not subject to Chinese
jurisdiction. Postal, customs and salt administrations were under
imperialist control. The Legation Quarters in Peking and conces-
sions and leased territories at many places in China formed states
within a state. Under such circumstances, so far as China was
concerned, the role of international law was merely to guarantee and
supplement the execution of unequal treaties.
In 1864, an American, W.A.P. Martin, chief instructor of Tung
Wen Guang, the first foreign language school in China, translated
Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law into Chinese. This
was followed by the translation of another American author
Theodore D. Woolsey's Introduction to the Study of International
Law (1860). The translation of these books into Chinese was an
epoch-making event in the study of international law in China. It
enabled the Chinese to have a first glimpse of what was called
international law in the West. This contribution of American
5. 1st ed. at 34; 8th ed. at 50.
The People's Republic of China and Public International Law 7
scholars to the study of international law in China forged the first
memorable link between Chinese and American international
lawyers. In 1864, the year in which Wheaton's work was translated,
a Danish ship was seized by a Prussian warship in Bo Hai Gulf in
the course of the Prussian-Danish War. The Chinese government
cited Wheaton in its protest to the Prussians and secured the release
of the Danish ship. This event created an illusion among the
Chinese of the usefulness of international law. The illusion was
enhanced by Martin's exaggerated claim in his "Preface to the
Chinese Edition" concerning the nature of international law. He
said: "It is called law, because it must be obeyed by all states; it is
called public because it cannot be made to serve private interests of
any one state." His interpretation of the word "public" was
entirely without foundation, and international law was not obeyed
by all states and was not even applicable to China. However, the
idea of the omnipotence of international law caught the imagination
of many Chinese officials. For example, Guo Sung Tao, the first
Chinese minister to the Court of St. James, wrote in his Chronicles
of a Mission to the West that the Western Powers "created the law
of nations; they emulate with each other in faithfulness and
righteousness, and lay particular emphasis on friendship among
nations; they are reasonable and courteous; they add decorum to
substance; they are far better than the states during the Spring and
Autumn Period. ' 6 A high official in the Koumintang government
Wang Chung Huei also praised international law to the skies. In his
preface to New Public International Law (1930) by Zhou Wei,
Wang wrote: The reason why China "suffered humiliation, paid
indemnities and ceded territories, was our ignorance of international
law". Of course, international law could not have that much effect
on the course of events. Humiliation suffered by China was due
principally to the imperialist policy of the Great Powers and the
incompetence, the corruption and the anti-people policy of the
reactionary ruling cliques in China. International law could do
nothing to change the semi-colonial degradation of China. But in
the eyes of the imperialists, even the possession of some elementary
knowledge of international law was regarded with horror. A story
about a French charg6 d'affaire in Peking was characteristic. This
charg6 d'affaire, upon learning of the translation of Wheaton by
6. A period in ancient Chinese history (770-476 B.C.) during which numerous
independent principalities existed side by side with each other.
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Martin, shouted in a fit of rage: "Who is the man who is going to
give the Chinese an insight into our European international law?
Kill him - choke him off; he will make us endless trouble! ' 7 No
wonder the imperialist powers were careful to bar China from the
application of international law.
Under these circumstances, the study of international law in
China was considered useless and frustrating and made little
headway. From late Qing Dynasty through the Koumintang period,
only a handful of scholars took up the study of international law
seriously. About 15 general treatises were written on international
law. The only field in which Chinese international lawyers made
intensive study was the question of unequal treaties and special
rights of foreign powers in China. These works had a nationalistic
ring, pursued with the hope of finding a way to put some restraint
upon imperialist oppression. But since they followed indiscrimi-
nately the theories expounded and rules made by the imperialist
powers for the imperialist powers, and given the subservient attitude
of the then Chinese governments, they could do very little to
advance the Chinese cause.
Early Chinese experience with international law is a key to the
understanding of the Chinese attitude toward international law
today. It explains why we laid special emphasis on state sovereignty
and equality, non-intervention, non-aggression, anti-hegemonism
and anti-colonialism.
II. The Study of International Law in New China
At the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China in
1949, the number of international lawyers on the mainland was very
small. But, with the Liberation, the study of international law
received a new breath of life. The Chinese state had for the first time
in one hundred years really stood up and became independent,
acquired full sovereignty, stood on equal terms with all the states of
the world, and was able to act with these states according to
international law based on the sovereign equality of all.
International law was no longer the privilege of the few. China, no
longer a passive on-looker, could henceforth participate in its
formulation and application.
7. Immanual Hsu, China's Entrance Into the Family of Nations, (Harvard
University Press, 1960) at 138.
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From the very beginning, the People's Government stressed the
importance of the study of international law. In order to promote the
study of international law and to train international lawyers, Soviet
experts were invited to teach international law in Chinese
universities. A considerable number of young international lawyers
were produced as a result. International law was taught in every law
college, in every university with a law faculty, and research units
for international law were set up in research institutes, such as the
Institutes of International Relations in Beijing and Shanghai. In
1964 an independent Institute of International Law was established.
But, unfortunately, political movements soon intervened. In 1969
the Institute was abolished. All law faculties in universities and law
colleges were abolished. Two were reestablished in 1970, but
actually did not function.
The principal academic body concerned with the study of
international law in the New China was the Chinese Political
Science and Law Association. It joined the International Law
Association in 1956 as a collective member, and participated in
many international academic activities in the field of international
law. Its publication "Studies in Political Science and Law"
contained many important articles on international law. Other
periodicals carrying international law articles were "Journal of
International Studies" published by the Institute of International
Relations in Beijing and "Legal Studies" published by the Institute
of Legal Studies and the East China College of Political Science and
Law in Shanghai. Both the Chinese Political Science and Law
Association and the Institute of International Relations were
abolished during the Cultural Revolution, together with their
publications.
With the downfall of the "Gang of Four", the study of
international law, like other fields of academic activities, received a
new lease on life. After the Cultural Revolution, China was faced
with the task of the Four Modernizations. To realize the Four
Modernizations, our task in the international sphere includes,
among others, the following: (1) to consolidate and strengthen a
peaceful international environment; (2) to promote friendship and
intercourse with other countries; (3) to increase and expand
economic, technical and cultural cooperation with other countries.
For the consolidation and strengthening of a peaceful interna-
tional environment, we need to study such problems as the legal
aspects of disarmament, the solution of boundary disputes, the
10 The Dalhousie Law Journal
non-use of force, anti-terrorism, anti-hegemonism, the role of the
U.N., etc.
For promoting friendship and intercourse with other countries,
we need to study such problems as the new international economic
order, dual nationality, diplomatic and consular laws, treaty laws,
pacific settlement of disputes, laws of international organizations,
etc.
For economic and technical cooperation with other countries, we
need to study the law of the sea, the law of air and outer space,
international environmental law, international economic and
commercial law, including the law relating to the World Bank,
IMF, FAO and the law connected with the activities of UNESCO.
The new situation is characterized by a more active role played by
China in international affairs. This calls for more work on
international law, both in academic and practical spheres. Chinese
activities in the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly has
intensified, and a Chinese member, Mr. Nee Zhen Yu, was elected
to the International Law Commission for the first time. The
international law community in China is bustling with activities.
Old law colleges and faculties have been restored and new ones set
up, with the total number approaching thirty. Law institutes and law
journals have been revived. A Chinese Society of International
Law, the first in Chinese history, was inaugurated in February,
1980. A Chinese Yearbook of International Law, under the auspices
of the Society, is scheduled for 1982. A textbook of international
law, long overdue, will also make its appearance soon. The
80-volume Encyclopedia Sinica, including a volume on law of
which international law will form part, will appear in due course.
Foreign international lawyers have come to lecture in China,
including Professor Jerome A. Cohen of Harvard, Professor Ronald
St. J. Macdonald of Dalhousie, and Professor Bing Cheng of
London. Others have made plans to come, such as Professor Homer
G. Angelo of California. A Ford Foundation Group of twelve
American law professors will be visiting Beijing to hold discussions
with Chinese law professors. Among them will be international law
professors Leon Lipson of Yale, Jerome A. Cohen of Harvard,
Randle Edwards of Columbia and Victor Lee of Stanford.
Numerous Chinese international lawyers have been invited to
lecture and do research abroad. We have also established and
resumed contact with international academic bodies. Professor
Wang Tie Ya of Peking University was elected associate of the
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Institute of International Law. Mr. Huang Jia Hua, myself and
several others took part in the World Conference of Jurists in
Madrid in 1979. Dr. Shen Yu attended as an observer at the
International Law Association Conference at Belgrade in 1981.-A
vista is now open for the development of international law studies in
China.
Since the founding of the PRC numerous works on international
law have been published. The first to be mentioned is a textbook:
International Law by Professor Zhou Geng Shen, published in
1967, a 2-volume, 800-page work. The most valuable part of this
work is the wealth of materials concerning the international law
practice of the PRC. A smaller volume by Zhon Geng Shen on
Trends in Modern International Law Thinking in Britain and the
United States was published in 1963. Apart from these two books,
Professor Zhou wrote numerous articles on international law, not to
mention the numerous books published in the pre-liberation days.
Ever since he became a professor of international law at the Peking
University in 1925, Professor Zhou had never departed from the
teaching and study of international law. It was not without reason
that he was called "the dean of Chinese jurists" .
8
The following published monographs may also be mentioned: Li
Hao Pei's A Comparative Study of Nationality Laws (1979), Nee
Zheng Yu's Jurisdiction of Courts in International Law (1964), Liu
Ze Rung's Law of Territorial Sea (1965), Fu Zhu's Problems
Concerning China's Territorial Sea (1959), Wang Yao Tien's
Treaties and Agreements on International Trade (1958).
During the years 1957 to 1960, a nation-wide debate took place
among Chinese international lawyers involving some fundamental
theoretical problems of international law. First, at the present stage
of international relations, how many systems of international law.
are there in the world? Does there exist a single system of
international law applicable to all states irrespective of class nature,
a system called "general international law", or "common
international law", or "modem international law", or "contem-
porary international law"? Or do there exist two systems of
international law: a bourgeois international law applicable to
capitalist states, and a socialist international law applicable to
socialist states? Or are there three systems of international law: a
8. See Samuel Kim, China, The United Nations and World Order, (1970), at 407,
note 3.
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bourgeois international law, a socialist international law and a
common international law? Second, according to the Marxist
precept, law is the manifestation of the will of the ruling class; it is a
superstructure built upon an economic base and serves that base.
The questions raised were: the will of which ruling class is
manifested in international law? Which economic base does
international law serve? The debate, however, went on for a
considerable time without reaching consensus.9
Apart from discussions on basic theories, international law
writings published in PRC fall into four groups:
(1) Articles dealing with criticisms of bourgeois international law.
In 1959 and 1960, a series of articles appeared in the "Journal of
International Studies", criticizing various aspects of bourgeois
international law, such as theories concerning state sovereignty,
subjects of international law, intervention, state territory, inhabit-
ants, etc. 10 By "bourgeois international law" the authors meant the
entire system hitherto accepted by capitalist states, though
criticisms were directed only against those most obnoxious parts
advocated and practiced by imperialist powers to serve their
imperialist purposes. These criticisms went behind legal appear-
ances and tackled the substance, the political significance of certain
9. For literature on the debate, see Zhou Ze Yah, "Nature of Modem International
Law" (1957), 7 Academics Monthly; Chiu Re Qing, "Again on the System of the
International Law of the Present Stage" (1958), 3 Legal Studies 40; Liu Jia Jee,
"Some Problems on the Nature and System of International Law", id. at 43; Hu
Wen Zhi "A Brief Comment on the Three Systems of International Law at the
Present Stage", id. at 49; Gen Fu Chen, "On the Present System of International
Law", id. at 52; Yang Dian Bee, "Some Thoughts on the Systems of International
Law", id. at 47; Lin Xin, "The Systems of International Law after World War II"
(1958), 7 Teaching and Research at 34; Zhou Fu Luen, "Nature of Modem
International Law" (1958), 3 Teaching and Research 52.
10. Tiao Yueh, "Preliminary Criticisms of Bourgeois International Law" (1959),
3 Journal of International Studies 1; Ying Tao, "Recognizing the True Face of
Bourgeois International Law Through a Few Concepts" (1960), 1 Journal of
International Studies at 42-43; Kung Meng, "Criticism of the Bourgeois
International Law Theories Concerning Subjects of International Law and
Recognition of States" (1960), 2 Journal of International Studies at 44-53; Ying
Tao, "Criticism of Bourgeois International Law Concerning State Sovereignty"
(1960), 3 Journal of International Studies at 47-52; I Xin, "What Does Bourgeois
International Law Explains about the Question of Intervention?" (1960), 4 Journal
of International Studies at 47-52; Qian Se, "A Criticism of the Views of Bourgeois
of International Law on the Question of Inhabitants" (1960), 5 Journal of
International Studies at 40-49; Xin Wu, "Criticism of Bourgeois International Law
on the Question of State Territory" (1960), 7 Journal of International Studies at
42-51.
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rules, the interests and political purposes they serve. They also
exposed the practical operation of rules, which, perhaps reasonable
in themselves, had in fact been manipulated to serve the one-sided
interests of strong imperialist powers. These articles suggested a
more critical and discriminating attitude toward the Euro-centered
international law and works by Western international lawyers,
which had formerly been taken at their face value. While it is
possible to find points of disagreement with these articles, and some
of the arguments could have shown more moderation, it cannot be
denied that the questions raised provided food for thought in the
further study of international law in China.
(2) Articles dealing with concrete international law problems with
which the PRC was directly concerned.
For example:
(a) Expositions of the fundamental principles of international law
- the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."'
(b) Arguments upholding China's sovereignty over Taiwan1
2
and opposing the "Two Chinas" conspiracy, 13 and those
demanding the restoration of the lawful rights of PRC in the United
Nations.14
(c) Concerning international law questions arising from the
Korean War such as the legal basis of the Chinese People's
Volunteers, China's recognition of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, the repatriation of POWs 15 and the U.S. spy planes.
11. E.g. Zhou Geng Shen, "The Principles of Peaceful Co-existence from the
Viewpoint of International Law" (1955), 6 Studies in Political Science and Law at
37-41; Ding Gu, "Firmly Maintain the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
(1959), 3 Journal of International Studies at 1-6; Wang Xuan, "Principles of State
Sovereignty- the Basis of International Law" (1980), 1 Journal of the College of
Political Science and Law, Beijing 43.
12. Zhou Geng Shen, "A Refutation of the Absurd Arguments Concerning the
Status of Taiwan" (1955), 1 Studies in Political Science and Law 46; Mei Ru Ao,
"Strip the Aggressors of Their Legal Cloak" (1955), 2 Studies in Political Science
and Law 47; Chen Tiqiang, "The Non-Existence of the So-called Question of the
Legal Status of Taiwan" (1955), 3 Studies in Political Science and Law 22.
13. Zhou Geng Shen, "A Refutation of the Absurd Arguments Aiming At
Creating 'Two Chinas' (1959), 1 Journal of International Studies 1; Shao Gin Fu,
"The Absurd Theory of 'Two Chinas' and Principles of International Law"
(1959), 2 Journal of International Studies 7.
14. Xu Dong Zhang, "Question of the Restoration of Lawful Rights and Position
of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" (1956), 6 Journal of
International Studies 11.
15. Mei Ru Ao, "An Absurd UN Resolution" (1955), 1 Studies in Political
Science and Law 43.
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(d) Concerning Sino-Indian boundary question. 16
(e) Concerning Tibet.17
(f) Concerning territorial disputes between China and
Vietnam.
18
(g) On miscellaneous subjects with which China was directly
concerned, such as the statement on territorial sea, 19 the arrest of
members of Chinese Trade Delegation by Brazilian authorities,
foreign intervention in Chinese judicial sovereignty,20 the launching
of spy balloons, the use of Hong Kong as hostile base against
China, the sabotage against Chinese aircraft in Hong Kong, the
piratical acts of the KMT clique, etc. 2 '
(3) Articles in support of just struggles of peoples in other
countries, such as Indo-China, 2 2 Cambodia, Egypt,23 Lebanon and
Jordan.
2 4
A symposium of international lawyers on Middle East crisis was
held on July 19, 1958. Their views were published in "Studies in
Political Science and Law." 25 There were also some articles on the
Hungarian crisis.
16. Zhou Geng Shen, "A Refutation of the One-Sided Indian Argument
Concerning Sino-Indian Boundary " (1959), 5 Studies in Political Science and Law
20; Wei Lian, "The Question of the So-Called McMahon Line Viewed From the
Angle of International Law" (1959), 6 Journal of International Studies 47; Chen
Tiqiang, "Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question" (1982), 1 Journal
of International Studies 11.
17. Zhou Geng Shen, "The Illegality of UN Intervention in the Question of Tibet"
(1959), 6 Studies in Political Science and Law 8; Fu Zhu, "Oppose US
Intervention in China's Domestic Affairs on the Pretext of Protection of Human
Rights" (1959), 6 Studies in Political Science and Law 12.
18. Zhang Hong Zen, "China's Sovereignty Over Xisha and Nansha Ar-
chipelagoes From the Point of View of International Law" (1980), 4 Red Flag 19.
19. Guo Jee, "An Important Measure for the Defense of State Sovereignty"
(1958), 5 Studies in Political Science and Law 87.
20. Guo Jee, "U.S. Intervention in China's Judicial Sovereignty" (1960), 2
Studies in Political Science and Law 4.
21. Chen Tiqiang, "Piratical Acts of Chiang Kai Shek Traitor Clique" (1954), 22
People's China 9 (in English); "Chiang and US - Accomplices in Piracy" (1954),
16 People's China 13 (in English).
22. Zhou Geng Shen, "Violation of Geneva Agreement by the South Vietnamese
Authorities Must not be Allowed" (1956), 6 Studies in Political Science and Law
24.
23. Zhao Li Hai, "The Suez Canal and International Law" (1956), Studies in
Political Science and Law 12; Liu Ding "Smash the Aggressors' Cynical
Lies"(1980), 8 Teaching and Research 3.
24. Chiu Re Qing, "Refute the Cynical Pretext of US and British Imperialists for
Their Aggression Against Lebanon and Jordan" (1958), 8 Legal Studies 7.
25. (1958), 4 Studies in Political Science and Law 1.
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(4) Articles on specific topics of international law.
These include articles on the definition of aggression, 26 collective
self-defence, 27 weapons of mass destruction, 28 treaties, 29 law of the
sea,30 outer space, 31 law of UN, 32 diplomatic immunities,
nationality law, 33 the Berlin question34 and the outlook of the
science of international law.
35
The partial listing of works above shows that the study of
international law had made considerable progress in the PRC, at
least prior to the Cultural Revolution. What obscured the Chinese
international law activities in those years from the Western
observers is probably the fact that there was little or no contact with
the West. Our only contact with the outside world was through the
Soviet experts who taught in Chinese universities and the Soviet
textbooks and writings which were used in Chinese classrooms.
Looking back on this period, the experience seems to have both
positive and negative sides.
26. Mei Ru Ao, "The Struggle for the Definition of Aggression" (1956), 2
Studies in Political Science and Law 7; Qiu Re Qing, "A Definition of Aggression
for the Maintenance of Peace and Security" (1956), Journal of East China College
of Political Science and Law; Chen Tiqiang, "Why Is It Necessary to Have a
Definition of Aggression?" (1953), 2 World Culture.
27. Wang Tie Ya, "Collective Self-Defence in International Law" (1955), 4
Studies in Political Science and Law 23.
28. Zhu Li Sun, "Use of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Is The Most Serious
Crime Against International Law" (1955), 4 Studies in Political Science and Law
30. Chen Tiqiang, "Poison Gas War Criminals Cannot Escape Just Judgement of
Humanity" (March 24, 1954), World Culture.
29. Wei Liang, "A Brief Comment on International Treaties Concluded Since the
Second World War", Collection of International Treaties (1953-5) at 660; Li Hao
Pei "Reservations to International Treaties" (1980), Social Science.
30. Liu Ze Rung, "Some Questions Concerning the Regime of Territorial Seas"
(1959), 2 Journal of International Studies 60; Wang Tie Ya, "The Present Legal
Status of the Continental Shelf" (1973), Journal of Peking University Philosophy
and Social Sciences: Chen Tiqiang, "The Generally Recognized Principle of the
Freedom of the Seas" (1954), 4 World Culture 31.
31. Liu Ze Rung, "Legal Status of Outer Space" (1959), 8 Journal of
International Studies 44.
32. Ding Liu, "Admission of New Members By UN" (1956), 1 Studies in
Political Science and Law 32.
33. Liu Jia Jee, "Question of Dual Nationality" (1957), 3 Legal Studies 20.
34. Zhou Geng Shen, "Question of West Berlin Seen From the Angle of
International Law" (1959), 3 Studies in Political Science and Law 1.
35. Wang Tie Ya "Present Trend of International Law" (1950), Journal of Peking
University - Philosophy and Social Sciences; Wang Tie Ya "International
Economic Law - an Important Branch of International Law" (1980), Democracy
and Law.
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On the negative side, the following may be mentioned:
(1) In learning from the Soviet experts, we had been too
dogmatic, accepting everything they said. There was a lack of
critical analysis. We did not give sufficient importance to the study
of China's own experience and experiences of other countries. We
did not make sufficient efforts at developing a Chinese system of the
science of international law and there was a lack of balance among
various views.
(2) Soviet views were mainly in the service of Soviet interests.
Their understanding of Marxism-Leninism was often one-sided.
(3) Soviet international lawyers often identified Soviet political
slogans and political needs of the time with international law.
These we discovered only after a painful process. On the other
hand, there was also a positive side.
(1) For those who had little contact with Marxism-Leninism
before, it was a good thing to be exposed to Marxism-Leninism in
connection with international law. Works of Marx, Engels and
Lenin seldom discuss international law as such, but some have
bearings on questions of international law. At least certain basic
Marxist concepts and principles can be applied to international law
questions, such as the concept of imperialism, colonialism, unequal
treaties, national self-determination, etc.
(2) With some knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, we are better
able to criticize imperialism and its impact on international law. We
are better able to analyze critically such rules of international law as
laid down by imperialist powers, the purpose of these rules and the
interests they serve.
(3) Paradoxically, the same method of critical analysis can
likewise be applied to Soviet views of international law. It gives us
now a better insight of how the minds of the Soviet lawyers work,
how they use international law for the furtherance of their
social-imperialist foreign policy.
The lesson from the past boils down to this: Marxism has still to
be studied in connection with international law. We must not
discard Marxism-Leninism because of our disagreement with Soviet
international lawyers. We must not throw away the baby with the
bath water. We must not divorce international law from
Marxism-Leninism.
The application of Marxism-Leninism to international law is by
no means an easy job. It will take Chinese international lawyers
long years of sustained and arduous efforts to learn how to combine
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Marxism-Leninism with international law. To my mind, however,
at least two Marxist-Leninist ideas have found their way into
Chinese international law thinking: (1) the use of class analysis,
and; (2) the application of proletarian internationalism.
As regards the first point, Chinese international lawyers can see
clearly that law is the reflection of class struggle, and any legal view
point must necessarily reflect certain class interests. It was pointed
out in the Communist Manifesto that "Your (i.e. bourgeois)
jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all".36
Lenin wrote: "Law is the expression of the will of the classes which
have emerged victorious and hold the power of the state."
37
These remarks refer principally to the law within a state. The
reflection of class interest through international law is a more
complicated matter than through municipal law. It is impossible to
apply directly and literally to international law the formula
applicable, to municipal law, such as the relation between economic
base and superstructure, or the theory that law is the reflection of the
will of the ruling class. Unlike a state which has only one ruling
class at one time, in the international scene there are many states,
many ruling classes and many class wills. However, the theory of
class will is applicable to international law to the extent that any rule
of international law which claims to have some viability, must, at a
given time, be consistent with the class interests or class wills of the
ruling classes of some states which promote the rule and use the
power at their disposal to make it effective. The more powerful
these states are, the greater chance of the rule's becoming effective.
There does not exist an immutable, ideal rule of international law,
nor the most reasonable, the most natural rule of international law.
Every state, i.e. the ruling class of every state, has its own idea of a
blue-print for the world, and would make efforts to make that
blue-print a reality. In order to attain this aim, the states would
struggle against each other or cooperate with each other, and create
and apply whatever international law that is useful for this purpose.
At any given time, there would be some basic principles of
international law which the majority of states, or the overwhelming
force within the international community, for one reason or another,
36. Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, Collected Works (Vol. 6, London: Lawrence
and Wishard, 1976), at 501.
37. V.I. Lenin, "The Agarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First
Russian Revolution 1905-1907", Collected Works (Vol. 13, Moscow: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1962) at 327.
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could agree, and support with forces at their disposal. These basic
principles would govern and determine the contents of minor rules.
Unless one state or one group of states acquires absolute
predominance, international law must contain some elements of
compromise. If and when such absolute predominance is attained by
one state, a world state would come into existence. Then it would be
the end of international law itself.
Short of becoming a world state, the predominant force in the
international community may consist of states ruled by the same
class. It may also consist of states ruled by different classes. The
fact that states are ruled by different classes does not prevent them
from agreeing to certain rules of international law, whereas states
ruled by the same class may often find themselves in disagreement.
Thus, prior to the October Revolution, all the major states were
capitalist states. Yet there were divergent views regarding many
rules of international law; while today, China, a socialist state, can
agree with capitalist states, especially of the Third World, on many
important matters of international law. During the Second World
War, the Axis states and the Anglo-American states all capitalist
states, fought a war of extermination against one another, whereas
the Anglo-American states formed an alliance with the Soviet
Union, a socialist state, and at the end of the war agreed to the
signing of the United Nations Charter. Thus, agreement of states on
rules of international law is independent of what classes are in
power within those states. It can be seen, therefore, that, unlike
rules of municipal law, which reflect the will of a single ruling class
of the state concerned, rules of international law agreed by the
majority of states and supported by the predominant force within the
international community do not reflect the will of one class, but
reflect the wills of all the ruling classes of various states
participating in their formulation. These ruling classes, though
antagonist, may, for one reason or another, find it in their interest to
agree to certain rules of international conduct.
With a better understanding of the nature of international law
through class analysis, Chinese international lawyers are now less
prone to accept blind-folded rules of international law advocated
and eulogized by imperialist states in the past, and would analyze
and assess every rule according to its merits. Those that serve
exclusively the interests of capitalism would be entirely unaccepta-
ble. Some rules, though bourgeois in origin, can under certain
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conditions serve the interests of the proletariat and world peace, and
as such would be conditionally acceptable.
Some writers argue that a state must accept international law in its
entirety; you cannot pick and choose. This does not square with
facts. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to say of what the
"entirety" of international law is consisted of, every state in fact
makes its own choice. This is done, not capriciously, but only after
calculating short and long term benefits, weighing the advantages to
be derived in the particular case on hand and those to be derived in
an over-all world strategy. A state faced with the task of formulating
or accepting a rule of international law would in most cases choose a
rule conducive to its long term benefits and advantageous to its
over-all world strategy and world outlook, at the expense of its
immediate advantages. It would also have to consider the need of
reciprocity: a short term advantage may turn into a disadvantage
when the roles are exchanged. With these considerations in mind, a
state's choice cannot but be limited. Witness the fact that certain
superpowers had to accept (albeit only verbally) anti-hegemonism
as a principle of international conduct. Their conduct has to be
restrained, at least to the extent that some explanation can be given
to prove their legality.
It is thus that the rules of international law accepted by the
overwhelming majority of states and supported by the dominant
forces in the international community becomes binding, not only
because of its acceptance by states, but also because it is in the
interest of those states to abide by it and to see that others do the
same.
However, while it is possible to identify a rule as a binding rule of
international law, yet there is still room for varying interpretation
and application. Here again class interests of states come into play.
The powerful imperialist states which made the 19th century rules
of international law would of course find the rules on a whole
agreeable to them. But even they often changed, or at least stretched
the law to suit their own convenience under changed circumstances.
Every state interprets the law (considered binding upon itself), and
applies it according to its own interpretation. Of course, such
interpretation and application cannot go against the basic principles
which the predominant force within the international community
supports, without suffering from unfavourable consequences.
The second point, the question of proletarian internationalism.
According to the understanding of the Chinese Communist Party,
20 The Dalhousie Law Journal
proletarian internationalism means opposing the oppression of our
own nation by any other nation, and at the same time opposing the
oppression of any nation by any other nation. Such a stand is based
upon the fundamental interests of the people of our own country, as
well as the fundamental interests of the people of the whole world.
For this reason, China, a socialist state long suffering from
imperialist oppression, is in whole-hearted support of proletarian
internationalism. For China, patriotism or nationalism is entirely
consistent with and complementary to proletarian
internationalism. 38 In the past, our struggle against imperialism
contributed to the struggle against colonialism by other oppressed
peoples, and, vice versa, their struggles were also of direct
assistance to us. Today, though no longer a semi-colony, we are
still faced with the task of building our country free from
molestation by hegemonist powers, a task in common with newly
emergent countries of the Third World. We feel ourselves by duty
bound to assist other oppressed nations in their struggle for national
liberation with the ultimate aim of eliminating all oppression in the
whole world. For China, to assist in the liberation of other
oppressed nations is part and parcel of the task of liberating
ourselves. For this reason, in international law we are all for the
respect of state sovereignty and equality; we are all for national
self-determination. We are opposed to aggression, intervention and
national oppression in any form. These ideas are inborn within our
system. Our overall attitude toward international law cannot be
divorced from this basic concept of world order.
From the works of the Chinese international lawyers mentioned
above, it is clear that proletarian internationalism is a basic tenet of
Chinese concept of international law. Proletarian internationalism is
a principle according to which all oppressed peoples and nations
should help each other in their struggle for liberation. One state can
not, in the name of "proletarian internationalism", demand
one-sided sacrifices from other states for the interest of the
"socialist commonwealth", which is but another name for the
Soviet Union itself.
For capitalist states, especially for powerful capitalist states,
national self-interest is the highest consideration in its international
conduct. For example, President Washington of the United States
declared in his farewell address: "It is folly for one nation to look
38. Liu Shao Qi, "Internationalism and Nationalism" (Peking, 1953) at 7-14.
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for disinterested favours from another . . .There can be no greater
error than to expect or calculate upon real favours from nation to
nation". 39 In a letter written in 1778, he again said: "No nation is
to be trusted farther than it is found by its own interests; and no
prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it" .40
Looking from a bourgeois philosophy of life, there is nothing wrong
about such an advice. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
also declared again and again that U.S. policy was guided by its
"enlightened self-interest". It is quite clear that, to the bourgeois
state, the purpose of international law is to safeguard, to promote
and to advance the interests of that state. China, while it expects the
same from international law from the point of view of nationalism,
demands more from international law, and takes into consideration
the principle of proletarian internationalism in the formulation of the
fundamental principles of international law.
III. PRC's Application of International Law and Contribution to
International Law
Ever since its founding, the PRC, in dealing with international
problems, often spoke about "recognized norms of international
law" or "general international practice", and has acted consistently
with these norms and practices. Although from time to time views
were expressed that "a revolution knows no law", or that "policy
over-rides law", the fact remains that, except during the chaotic
conditions of the Cultural Revolution and in certain isolated cases,
the PRC's record of conducting international relations on the basis
of international law is good.
For example, in the question of recognition and the question of
the succession of governments, China has acted strictly in
accordance with the generally recognized rules of international law.
With regard to treaties concluded by former governments, Article
55 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (1949) declared: "The Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China must study the
treaties and agreements concluded by the Koumintang government
with foreign governments and, depending on their contents,
recognize, annul, revise or re-conclude them". Much was made of
this by foreign sources as evidence of non-observance of
39. G. Marion, Bases and Empire (1949) at 13.
40. Id.
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international obligations by the PRC. But, as unequal treaties are
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of sovereignty and
equality of states, the observance of unequal treaties is not an
obligation under modern international law. Furthermore, as the
PRC has a class character radically different from that of the old
China, the vital condition existing at the time of the conclusion had
ceased to exist. These treaties had become void by the simple
operation of the principle rebus sic stantibus. On other questions,
such as China's sovereignty over Taiwan, China's lawful right in
the U.N., the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, the Sino-Vietnamese
dispute over the South China Sea Islands, the delimitation of
Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf, the
position of the PRC is absolutely unassailable in international law.
With regard to the question of the U.S. barracks in Beijing, these
barracks were the remnants of imperialist oppression. Their
retention in the hands of a foreign power was inconsistent with the
principle of territorial sovereignty. It was entirely within China's
lawful rights to recover them. The fact that they were taken over on
the ground of requisition demonstrates an intention to soften the
blow. The taking over of the properties of the British firm, the Asia
Oil Company on April 30, 1951 was based on the lawful ground of
requisition. In view of the violation of the immunity of China's state
property in Hong Kong, the British government certainly had
nothing to complain against the consequence of its own undisguised
violation of international law. In the case of the shooting of a British
civil aircraft over Hainan on July 23, 1954, China demonstrated
over-scrupulous respect for international law. Out of humanitarian
consideration, she paid prompt and adequate compensation for the
loss, although responsibility for the injury under the circumstances
was debatable. In the Taiwan question, distinction was made by
China between the liberation of Taiwan which was a Chinese
domestic question and U.S. intervention in Taiwan which was an
international question. Only the latter was to be solved through
negotiation between the U.S. and China. Such a fine distinction
attests to China's accurate application of international law.
Even under the most extreme provocations, China has conducted
herself with the utmost restraint, going beyond the requirements of
international law. For example, in the border clashes with India in
1962 and Vietnam in 1979, in response to armed attacks by India
and Vietnam, the Chinese border defense forces counter-attacked in
self-defence. Once they had driven the attackers from the border
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regions, they suddenly, at the height of victory, withdrew behind
China's own borders, although a thorough crushing of the enemy
could have been achieved by further advancing into enemy
territories. Such acts of self-restraint for the interest of international
peace and order are unprecendented in history.
Apart from applying international law, the PRC also made
positive contributions to the development of international law.
(1) Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The five principles
were first initiated in the Agreement Between Republic of India and
People's Republic of China on the Trade and Intercourse Between
Tibet Region of China and India of April 29, 1954, in which the two
countries declared themselves resolved to base their relations upon
the following principles: (a) mutual respect for each other's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, (b) mutual non-aggression, (c)
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (d) equality
and mutual benefit, and (e) peaceful coexistence. In a Joint
Statement of June 28 of the same year, the Prime Ministers of the
two countries declared that these principles "should be applied in
their relations with countries in Asia, as well as in other parts of the
world", and "in international relations generally". China followed
this up with similar joint statements with Burma (June 29, 1954)
and Indonesia (April 28, 1955). The "Ten Principles" contained in
the Final Communiqu6 of the Bandung Conference of April 24,
1955 and proclaimed as the basis of friendly cooperation among
participating states were a corollary and development of the Five
Principles. The Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of October 12, 1954
and the Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communiqu6 of July 7, 1955 both
emphasized the Five Principles as the basis of relations with other
states. Other states followed suit.41 The Soviet Union at first tried to
avoid the application of the Five Principles to relations between
herself and Eastern European states, but was compelled to accept
them in her relations with these states in her Declaration of October
30, 1956.42 But she nevertheless used every opportunity to stress
that the Five Principles only apply to relations between states with
different social systems, thereby trying to evade her obligations
41. E.g. Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 2, 1955, Soviet-Indian Joint
Statement of June 22, 1955, Soviet-Vietnamese Joint Communique of July 18,
1955, Indian-Laos Joint Statement of September 11, 1955.
42. Declaration on the Foundation for the Development and Further Strengthening
of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist
States.
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toward the Eastern European states. The Soviet manipulation,
however, could not in the least diminish the significance of the Five
Principles as fundamental principles of universal application. The
"Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of U.N." adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
on December 16, 1970, reiterated the substance of the Five
Principles and exhorted U.N. members to observe them in their
mutual relations. In the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 12,
1974, the Five Principles were enumerated word by word as
"Fundamentals of International Economic Relations".
Despite its initial reluctance to accept the Five Principles, the
United States finally and formally recognized them as basis upon
which to manage the relations between states, in the Joint
Communiqu6 of February 27, 1972 with China. A similar
confirmation of the Five Principles was made in the Sino-Japanese
Joint Statement of September 29, 1972. With these, the Five
Principles have completely established themselves as the fundamen-
tal principles of international law recognized by the whole world.
While it is true that each of the individual principles constituting
the Five Principles has long existed and was not initiated by the
PRC, putting the five together as an integral whole is something
unprecedented and of great significance. The Five Principles as an
integral whole is not the same as the sum total of the five individual
principles. By being put together, the Five Principles individually
and as a whole acquired new meanings. They are a reflection of the
new international situation created by the rise and growing role of
Third World states.
The principle of the mutual respect of sovereignty is not the same
principle of sovereignty as existed in the 19th century, which gave
free rein to powerful states to do what they liked, including the
waging of wars of aggression and conquest. It ordains that the
territory of every state should not be violated, that the people of
every state should have the right to decide their own destinies, to
choose their economic, social and political systems and ways of
life, that oppressed nations and peoples should have the right to
liberate themselves. The words "mutual respect" put the
sovereignty of one state in the context of a world system in which
the sovereignty of all states should receive equal respect. The
sovereignty of one state is limited, in a sense, by the equal
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sovereignty of others. But this is not the same as the doctrine of
"limited sovereignty", which reduces the sovereignty of other
states to one of dependency for the benefit of the unlimited
sovereignty of one or two powerful states.
The principles of mutual non-aggression and non-intervention are
not only supplements to the principle of sovereignty but have their
own special significance. The principle of non-aggression not only
prohibits the launching of aggressive wars against other countries,
but also prohibits concealed armed attacked, indirect aggression and
war by proxy against other states. The principle of non-intervention
in domestic affairs of other states, prohibits any act to compel other
states to adopt or not to adopt certain economic, social or political
systems, to help suppress revolutionary movements, to create
national dissensions or to foster or install puppet regimes. The
principle of non-intervention prevents foreign reactionary forces
from making common cause with domestic reactionary forces in
suppressing revolutionary movements and movements of national
self-determination. Chinese experience shows that, without foreign
intervention, revolution in China would have succeeded much
earlier. Revolution concerns the people of the country alone. It can
have a chance of success only when the people are ready for it and
demand it. For this reason, revolution cannot be exported, nor
should counter-revolution. China's support of the principle of
non-intervention is genuine and sincere, and it has its root in
fundamental revolutionary principles.
The principle of equality requires not only formal equality, but
also, more importantly, substantive equality. Sometimes formal
equality is not only superficial, but is even used to cover up real
inequality. Sometimes wordings in a treaty are couched in
reciprocal and identical terms for both parties, but actually the
advantages accrue only to the side which is economically or
militarily stronger. On the other hand, real equality sometimes is
attained by formal inequality. For example, the establishment of the
New Economic Order requires giving developing nations special
preferences. According to the principle of equality, all unequal
treaties should be abolished. Theoretically, unequal treaties are
illegal and void ab initio, but as a practical matter, the PRC has
shown great patience and was willing to consult with the other party
or parties concerned to take practical measures to rectify the state of
inequality. Such is China's attitude in the Sino-Soviet boundary
question. We merely demand the Soviet Union to acknowledge in
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principle the inequality of the treaties concerned, but would wait for
negotiations to find a satisfactory solution. This is the minimum for
the Soviet Union, which styles itself as a socialist state, to do.
According to the principle of equality, one-member-one-vote
should be the organizational principle of international organiza-
tions. For a state to have three votes in the U.N. is entirely
unreasonable. The rule of the unanimity of permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council is a product of historical circumstances.
It may be re-examined, when there is a radical change of
circumstances, provided that the majority of members believe it to
be inconsistent with the principle of equality and can devise a
satisfactory substitute.
Especially in the economic sphere, not only equality, but also
mutual benefit is required. Premier Zhou En-lai stated in his speech
at the Asian-African Conference on April 19, 1955: "Among us
Asian and African countries, cooperation should be based on
equality and mutual benefit, and no special conditions should be
attached. Trade and economic cooperation among us should aim at
the promotion of economic independence of each country, and
should not make one side a mere producer of raw materials or a
market for consumers' goods. In cultural exchanges among us, we
should respect the national cultural development of each country, so
that we can learn from each other."
4 3
The principle of peaceful coexistence is the overall name for all
the Five Principles, but at the same time has specific contents itself.
According to this principle, a state should not only refrain from
doing any thing to break to the peace, such as committing
aggression and intervention, or threatening, bullying and control-
ling other states, but should also take positive measures to lessen the
danger of war, to oppose war plots, to withdraw armed forces
stationed abroad, to dismantle military bases abroad, to carry out
real and not fictitious disarmament, to try pacific means for settling
international disputes, to create conditions for the economic
prosperity and balanced development of all countries, to give
economic assistance to developing countries, to eliminate racial
discrimination, to develop international cultural exchanges, etc.
The PRC has always pursued a policy of peace and worked for
peace among nations. This is not entirely out of altruism or abstract
43. Documents on Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China,
1954-1955 (in Chinese) at 247.
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notion of pacificism, but also out of consideration of her own actual
needs. She had had long years of war, and is badly in need of a
peaceful environment to build up her economy. China's opposition
to war plots and her warnings against the possibility of war,
certainly does not mean that she wants war. On the contrary, it
shows how strongly she abhors war and is eager for peace. The fear
that warning against war would provoke war is entirely unfounded
and contrary to common sense. War will only spring on the
unprepared. To struggle against war is an important constituent part
of the principle of peaceful existence.
(2) Eight principles of foreign aid. Premier Zhou En-lai in his
report on his visit to 14 friendly nations in April 1964 declared the
following eight principles as principles China has followed and
would continue to follow in giving aids to foreign countries. (1) to
give aid in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual
benefit; to regard aid as a reciprocal act and not as a one-sided act of
benevolence; (2) to strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient
state, attaching no condition whatever and demanding no special
privileges; (3) to give economic aids at reasonable interest rates;
(4) to help the recipient state on the path of self-reliance and
independence, not to create a condition of dependence on China;
(5) to undertake only construction projects which require a
minimum amount of investment and can be put to use in the shortest
possible time, and which would enable the recipient state to increase
its income and accumulate capital; (6) to ensure that China will
supply equipment and material of the highest quality at international
market prices; (7) to guarantee that the personnel of the recipient
state acquire the necessary techniques; (8) to require that Chinese
aid experts enjoy only the same material treatment as experts of the
recipient state; any special demands or enjoyments are forbidden.
These principles are unprecedented in their generosity and
unselfishness. They are the concrete manifestation of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the field of foreign aid.
China's adoption of these eight principles was motivated by her
adhesion to proletarian internationalism. The sooner the developing
countries achieve economic independence, the better chance there is
of preserving world peace, which is the aim and purpose of the
PRC.
(3) Anti-hegemonism. Since the Second World War,
hegemonism practised by the super-powers has threatened world
peace. Soviet hegemonism is now in the ascendency. The Soviet
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Union occupied Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1970,
egged on Vietnam to invade and occupy Cambodia, and placed
Laos under Vietnamese control. Apart from armed invasions and
occupation of other states, the Soviet Union has been carrying on
subversion, sabotage, assassination, intervention, war by proxy and
installing and fostering puppet regimes in many countries.
Hegemonism is the greatest danger to world peace at the present
time. China is the first country to call attention to that danger. In an
article "In commemoration of Mr. Sun Yat Sen" printed in the Ren
Min Re Bao, November 20, 1956, Chairman Mao Zetung
announced China's determination to eliminate absolutely great
nation chauvinism in China's conduct of foreign relations. He
declared himself resolutely opposed to the big nations bullying the
small, the powerful nations bullying the weak. The affairs of world,
he said, should be decided by all the states of the world; it is not
permissible for superpowers to manipulate and monopolize
everything. The idea of anti-hegemonism was accepted by U.S. and
Japan in their respective joint communiqu6 with China in 1972.
"The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of Nations" passed
by the U.N. General Assembly on December 13, 1974 also made
"no attempt to seek hegemony and spheres of influence" a
principle governing the economic as well as political relations
among states.
China even enshrined the policy of anti-hegemonism in her
Constitution of March 5, 1978, which declared in its Preamble:
"We shall never practice hegemonism"; we "are opposed to the
hegemonism of the superpowers".
The Soviet Union, finding her hegemonist behavior exposed and
condemned by world opinion, was furious with the doctrine of
anti-hegemonism. She attacked the Sino-U.S. and the Sino-
Japanese Joint Communiques as "anti-Soviet". But in the fall of
1979, she put out feelers that she was also against hegemonism. On
September 25, the Soviet Union formally tabled at the U.N. General
Assembly a draft resolution entitled "Inadmissibility of the policy
of hegemonism in international relations".
The Soviet Union, the bitter opponent of anti-hegemonism, was
now trying to pass herself off as the champion of anti-hegemonism.
The accused was trying to play the part of the accuser. However, it
did not escape one's notice that, in the Soviet draft resolution,
hegemonism was described as "the desire of some states to
dominate other states and people" - a description far from
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adequate to identify a hegemonist power. How can one identify a
hegemonist power simply by its "desire", with no manifestation of
conduct? All that the Soviet draft resolution required was to
"condemn" such a policy, without any measure of implementation.
In a genuine effort to eliminate hegemonism, the Chinese
Delegation submitted a draft resolution listing the concrete
manifestations of hegemonism and proposed concrete measures for
its elimination. Third World countries also submitted a draft
resolution of their own, substantially similar to the Chinese draft.
The Chinese Delegation thereupon declared itself in support of the
Third World draft. As a result of General Assembly discussion, the
Third world resolution was passed on November 30 by an
overwhelming majority of 87-4, with 24 abstentions. With the
passage of the resolution by the General Assembly, anti-
hegemonism has fully established itself as a supplement to the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
(4) On the question of pre-existing treaties concluded by
previous governments, the Chinese attitude has been: the state of
China as a subject of international law remains unaffected by the
revolution; however, having gone through a fundamental change in
its social system, China cannot be bound by treaties concluded
under former regimes which are incompatible with the new social
system. Unequal treaties are void ab initio. But some of these
treaties had in the course of history created certain conditions of fact
which must be dealt with cautiously and reasonably. International
law has always recognized that personal treaties and treaties of
dynastic guarantee do not pass on to successor governments. Under
modem conditions, certain treaties, though not dynastic guarantee
treaties in appearance, are in fact concluded with the view to
perpetuate a particular regime. Such treaties should be included
within the category of dynastic guarantee treaties and terminate with
the fall of the regime. Refusal of the PRC to be bound by such
treaties has the support of both reason and logic.
(5) Dual nationality. Article 3 of the new Nationality Law
promulgated by the PRC on June 28, 1980 provides: "The People's
Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any
Chinese national". The question of dual nationality has plagued
international relations and taxed the ingenuities of international
lawyers for ages. Although efforts have been made to eliminate or
reduce the occurrence of dual nationality, little results have been
achieved, as long as states adopt different principles in their
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nationality laws and insist upon giving priority to their own
nationalities. The new Chinese Nationality Law makes it clear that
under certain conditions of dual nationality, the Chinese nationality
will automatically give way, such as the case provided in article 5.
That article states: "Any person born abroad whose parents are
Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national has
Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are Chinese
nationals and have settled abroad or one of whose parents is a
Chinese national and has settled abroad and has acquired foreign
nationality on birth does not have Chinese nationality." Thus a
person of Chinese parentage who acquires a foreign nationality on
birth for other reasons automatically loses his Chinese nationality.
Also by Article 9, "Any Chinese national who has settled abroad
and who has been naturalized there or has acquired foreign
nationality of his own free will automatically loses his Chinese
nationality." At the same time, the law also makes sure that persons
who acquire Chinese nationality through naturalization or restora-
tion do not retain their foreign nationalities.
There are indeed, some states which also declared in their
nationality laws that they do not recognize dual nationality. But
what they wanted to eliminate is not their nationalities, but the
nationality of the other state concurrently possessed by one of its
citizens. This does not diminish the occurrence of dual nationality.
If anything, the question of dual nationality would be aggravated,
not solved. It is only when all states adopt a self-denying policy like
that of China, will there be hope for the gradual diminishing and
perhaps the final elimination of the occurrence of dual nationality.
(6) On the question of recognition, the PRC manifests a tendency
to adopt the policy of mutual recognition, which is a corollary of the
principle of equality. Closely related is the establishment by the
PRC of "semi-diplomatic relations" with certain states, namely the
U.K. and the Netherlands. Full diplomatic relations did not follow
the recognition of the PRC by these states, because their
recognitions were incomplete, half-hearted, in fact, a "semi-
recognition." The establishment of Liaison Offices by PRC and the
U.S. in each other's capital from 1972 to 1979 was also an
innovation in the practice of diplomatic institutions.
(7) People's diplomacy. In the early days of the founding of the
PRC, relations with many countries which did not recognize the
new China were carried on through people's diplomacy. Non-
government bodies were created by China and other countries
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concerned. They handled practical matters in various fields, such as
trade, fisheries, sports, cultural exchanges, visits of personnel, etc.
The most notable examples are as follows: (1) the Sino-Japanese
Trade Agreement between the Commission for the Promotion of
International Trade of the PRC and the Federation of Japanese
Parliamentarians for the Promotion of Japan's Trade, signed on
June 1, 1952, which provided for the establishment of Offices of
Trade Representatives; (2) the Agreement between Chinese
Fisheries Association and the Japan-China Fisheries Association on
Fisheries in Yellow Sea and East China Sea, signed on April 15,
1955; (3) the Joint Statement signed on October 3, 1956 by the
Commission for the Promotion of International Trade of the PRC
and the Singapore and Malay Industry and Commerce Study Group.
These bodies worked so effectively that for practical purposes the
relations between the countries concerned were carried on smoothly
as if official relations were existing between them. The cooperation
between non-government bodies of states not having established
diplomatic relations with each other is not unknown in history, but
the wide use of such a procedure for a long duration is a special
feature of Chinese diplomacy. Such a practice is useful to new states
and governments in resisting pressure from foreign states, which
make unreasonable demands as a price of recognition. It is also
useful to a non-recognizing state whose non-recognition is the result
of pressure by a third state, but itself would have liked to have
practical dealings with the un-recognized regime. The practicability
of People's diplomacy stems from the fact that there are no basic
contradictions between peoples and that the extension of trade and
cultural relations between peoples work for the benefit of all.
IV. Conclusion
A thorough study of the theory and practice of international law in
the People's Republic of China is bound to be a long and arduous
task. It is not attempted in this paper, which aims only at presenting
some introductory thoughts, and which, it is hoped, will provoke
discussion and criticism from international lawyers both in China
and abroad.
